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be used, they could indicate that the DNA evidence is of 
much lower, if any, probative value. Thus, so-called match 
probabilities are potentially misleading if they are used to 
answer questions that they are not designed to answer. 
We will return to this case later in this article and will see 
what happens as the case approaches trial.
The figure of a billion, and other figures regularly 
advanced in legal proceedings, are both pressing and 
hard to comprehend, even for many experts. As many 
reporting scientists can confirm, given a statistic of this 
kind obtained in a case, they almost inevitably face the 
question “And is it good evidence?” – a question they may 
feel pushed to answer “yes”, an answer they may even feel 
intuitively comfortable with. However, as we will try to show, 
“yes” should not be the scientist’s first answer because, in 
the absence of context, no suitable answer can be given. 
The scientist should rather ask “evidence for what?” Are we 
interested in who is the source of the detected DNA, or are we 
interested in whether a particular alleged activity occurred? We 
will tease out these intricacies in what follows, as they can have 
a crucial bearing on the meaning of DNA evidence in a case.
What happens in court with DNA evidence?
Generally, DNA evidence adduced in court will consist of DNA 
profiles that match each other – whether they be questioned 
profiles that match the known, reference profile of the 
defendant (if the alleged DNA transfer is believed to be from 
the defendant to a scene or complainant) or questioned profiles 
that match the reference profile of the complainant/victim 
(if the alleged transfer is from the complainant/victim to the 
defendant). The forensic scientist presenting the DNA evidence 
will usually describe the nature of the matching profiles and, in 
the UK, the Republic of Ireland and some European jurisdictions, 
will quote a match probability or a likelihood ratio (LR) to help 
the fact-finder evaluate the DNA evidence. In other jurisdictions, 
different statistics, such as the combined probability of exclusion 
or combined probability of inclusion, may be quoted instead of 
match probabilities or likelihood ratios, though the meaning and 
usefulness of such figures are controversial, mainly because 
they are spuriously suggesting a conclusion as to whether the 
compared items have a common source.
A match probability, in its simplest form, is the probability 
of obtaining matching DNA profiles if the DNA had come from 
someone other than, and unrelated to, the defendant (or 
complainant/victim, as appropriate). The statistics from which 
match probabilities are assigned have been well researched, 
tested and documented and, with the possible exception of 
statistics derived from some complex mixtures of DNA, are 
now generally accepted by the courts. 
The likelihood ratio is the ratio of two probabilities: the first 
is the probability of obtaining matching DNA profiles if the 
DNA had come from the defendant (or complainant/victim, 
as appropriate), and the second is the match probability just 
described, i.e. the probability of obtaining matching DNA profiles 
if the DNA had come from someone other than, and unrelated to, 
the defendant (or complainant/victim, as appropriate). Both these 
Imagine the police knocking on your front door early one morning and arresting you on suspicion of a serious crime. They suspect you of assaulting a woman whom you know. She alleges that, during an argument, you 
grabbed a heavy necklace that was around her neck and pulled 
it tightly, causing her to pass out momentarily. You willingly 
provide a sample for DNA profiling.
The necklace and reference samples from the complainant 
and suspect are submitted to the forensic science provider 
with a request that DNA profiling be carried out on the items. 
Weeks later, when the results from the forensic laboratory 
become available, the police reveal that a DNA profile 
matching yours was found on the necklace. They say that the 
forensic scientist’s report quotes a match probability of 1 in a 
billion and they charge you with the offence. 
In the face of what appears to be very powerful DNA 
evidence, it might be tempting for you to plead guilty. Indeed, 
you may well be advised by your lawyer to do so to gain credit 
for an early guilty plea. However, all may not be as it appears. 
While the statistics underpinning the match probability 
quoted by the scientist may be well founded and robust, they 
may not be the most relevant and reliable statistics for this 
case. In some situations, match probabilities can be highly 
misleading because were other, more relevant, probabilities to 
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probabilities are conditioned on task-relevant circumstances and 
background information. As we will see later, this information 
may have crucial effects on probability assignments.
Typical match probabilities and LRs quoted for complete 
DNA profiles are very impressive, and seemingly very 
persuasive, but therein lies the danger for defendants, lawyers, 
judges and jurors unaware of the potential pitfalls in uncritical 
acceptance of the figures. Even some experts themselves 
may inadvertently present potentially misleading figures. At 
their simplest, these figures take account only of the rarity 
of genetic features in the population and do not take into 
account other factors such as, for example, the probability of 
an error occurring at some point in the process (e.g., handling 
or labelling error, clerical errors, etc.). Expert activity is known 
not to be error-free; hence omitting this factor raises issues of 
lack of transparency. There is ongoing discussion on whether 
the potential of error should be incorporated in likelihood 
ratios, or perhaps discussed separately. Moreover, since 
case-specific probabilities of error presumably are several 
orders of magnitude greater than – and hence nowhere near 
– the tiny match probabilities, their impact on probative value 
should deserve more attention than they currently receive in 
scholarship and practice.1
Lawyers representing the defendant (or appellant) can 
adopt various strategies with DNA evidence depending 
on, among other considerations, what the defendant tells 
them, the facts at issue in the case, the strength of the other 
evidence, the availability of a second, defence-commissioned, 
expert opinion and, in the absence of such a second opinion, 
the lawyer’s own understanding and appreciation of the 
subtleties of DNA evidence. On this basis, they may:
1. decide not to contest the DNA evidence and advise their 
client to offer a guilty plea;
2. accept the match but offer alternative explanations, such as 
legitimate, prior contact; or
3. contest the evidence and suggest there has been an 
inadvertent transfer either before the items arrive at 
the forensic science laboratory or within the laboratory 
itself (i.e., a technical failure in the process of collecting, 
extracting and analysing DNA). 
In the experience of the authors, the more common strategy 
in cases of first instance, and on appeal in England and Wales, 
is the second of these strategies – that of exploring alternative 
explanations for the finding of matching profiles. Experts 
are asked about the possibilities, as well as sometimes the 
probabilities, of DNA being obtained through a variety of ways, 
including those that can be termed “primary”, “secondary” and 
“tertiary” transfers. The expert is drawn into giving opinions about 
specific activities, such as helping an injured victim, engaging in 
social activities (e.g., shaking hands or hugging) or handling an 
intermediary object, that may give rise to innocent transfer. 
It is worth stressing here that forensic scientists presenting 
DNA evidence in the UK have been trained not to give an 
opinion, for sound legal and logical reasons, on the probable 
source of the matching DNA profile. The probability that the 
defendant was the source of the DNA, given that a match has 
been obtained, would be a form of posterior probability. The 
Court of Appeal in England and Wales cautioned against experts 
providing this form of opinion because the decision on the origin 
of the matching DNA profile is entirely within the remit of the 
fact-finder who has the benefit of hearing all of the evidence 
in the case.2 In logical terms, a posterior probability could be 
a manifestation of the fallacy of the transposed conditional3 
or it could be the product of an inadvertent, but biased, prior 
probability. In the USA, federal experts have been cautioned4 
against advising that there is reasonable scientific certainty 
that, for example, the DNA originated from the accused – such 
opinions would also be examples of posterior probabilities. 
While it is to be hoped that experts do not give opinions in 
the form of posterior probability for the source of the DNA, 
in contrast they regularly give opinions on the probability 
that a particular suggested activity, that could give rise to 
DNA transfer, actually took place. But this, too, represents a 
transgression of the scientist’s domain of competence: by 
opining directly on alleged events of “transfer”, they opine 
on alleged activities, rather than on the DNA findings given 
alleged activities, as demanded by the likelihood ratio. By 
focusing on providing a likelihood ratio, the expert leaves it to 
the court, in its rightful role, to distinguish between the alleged 
activities given all the evidence brought before it. 
Why may cases go wrong?
Cases can be said to “go wrong” in two broad situations where 
matching DNA profiles have been found.
A person who is truly the perpetrator may have no 
proceedings brought against him, or is found not guilty, when 
the probative value of the DNA evidence has been undervalued 
by the expert. We believe this to be a rare occurrence and we 
do not intend to discuss this type of case further.
On the other hand, there is potential for miscarriage 
of justice in those situations where a person who is truly 
not the perpetrator is charged and tried, and the matching 
DNA profiles have been overvalued at some point in the 
reasoning. Standard definitions and terminology would help 
the recipients of expert information to appreciate the kinds of 
questions forensic experts can and cannot address, providing 
univocal understanding of these standards across scientific 
and legal disciplines.
Let us return to our case example of the necklace and the 
alleged assault to see how these may impact our case.
When the case was submitted to the forensic science 
provider, the request was for a DNA examination of the 
items. There was limited explanation of the relevant case 
circumstances. The scientist did not ask for clarification of the 
facts at issue and assumed that a source-level evaluation 
would meet the needs. The expert found a clear, “major” profile 
matching the defendant, mixed with, as would be expected from 
an item that had been worn, a background profile corresponding 
with that of the wearer (the complainant). The profile 
corresponding with the complainant was at a low level and was 
regarded as a “minor” profile. The expert provided an evaluation 
of an LR at source level for the major profile – the LR was of 
the order of 1 billion – and reported this as extremely strong 
support for the view that the DNA originated from the defendant 
rather than from another, unknown person unrelated to the 
defendant (technically, this would be classed as an evaluation at 
“sub-source” because there has been no attribution of the DNA 
profile to a particular body fluid or type of tissue).
In court, the defence team explore with the expert the 
possibility that the matching DNA was transferred via an 
intermediary agent, so-called secondary transfer. The expert 
hears from the defence lawyer, for the first time, that the 
defendant is the cohabiting partner of the complainant. She is 
asked, “Could the defendant’s DNA have been transferred via 
the complainant’s hands after she had touched his skin … or 
after handling his underwear … or through using the same towel, 
etc.?” The expert would have to concede that any of these 
transfers would somehow be possible – but how likely would 
they be? The probabilities of secondary transfer under a specific 
set of circumstances, as in this case, would be impossible to 
assign without extensive knowledge of the couple’s home and 
habits, and without thorough testing of items in the home for the 
presence of DNA. The expert may be tempted to give a posterior 
probability for a particular transfer, but that opinion – as we 
have already mentioned – may be poorly based, biased and 
misleading, and go beyond the expert’s area of competence. 
So, at the end of the expert’s evidence, the fact-finder is left 
with, on the one hand, an impressive big number (the LR) but 
justice process. This overvaluing has its root cause in the 
presentation, without qualification, of match probabilities, or 
LRs, for matching profiles in the context of what have been 
called issues of “source”. However, if the fact at issue is more 
appropriately at the level of “activity”, then the probative value 
of the evidence may be much lower.5, 6
Match probabilities at source level for complete, or “full”, 
DNA profiles are reported, in the UK, of the order of 1 in 1 
billion, with corresponding LRs for such profiles being of the 
order 1 billion. These mind-boggling figures, taken together 
with the portrayal of DNA evidence in the media, must appear 
to be very persuasive to lay fact-finders and many lawyers. 
However, if the fact at issue were to be placed in the context 
of a more appropriate level, that of activity, the probabilities 
in the numerator and denominator of an LR could well be 
determined primarily by the factors of transfer, persistence 
and detection of DNA rather than that of match probability. 
Depending on the precise specification of the prosecution and 
defence propositions, the LR may well then approach a value 
close to 1, meaning there would be practically no probative 
force in the DNA evidence; it would provide no assistance to 
anyone asked to judge which proposition is true.
Based on judgments from the Court of Appeal of England 
and Wales in DNA cases, there seems to be poor appreciation 
by lawyers of the risks of misleading evidence being 
presented when there is a lack of clarity about the level of the 
fact at issue that they think is being addressed through the 
DNA evidence. And this lack of clarity does not necessarily 
lie solely with lawyers; experts themselves can be the 
source of confusion when they fail to identify, or are not in a 
position to identify, the fact at issue in the case. Difficulties 
also arise where there is confusion about the differences 
between propositions and explanations. In forensic science 
contexts, unlike formal propositions, ‘explanations’ are ad 
hoc and intermediate considerations that are generated after 
the forensic findings have been obtained. Explanations have 
the potential to account for particular observations, but may 
disregard relevant case context and circumstantial information, 
and hence be speculative or fanciful. For example, a suspect 
may argue that the DNA match can be explained because his 
twin brother is the source. This is fanciful if there is nothing 
in the background information to suggest that the suspect 
could have a twin brother. Confusion also arises when people 
use the terms “likelihood ratios”, “match probabilities” and 
“posterior probabilities” almost interchangeably. 
What should happen?
The first important factor to help avoid misinterpretation of 
DNA evidence is the early identification of the facts at issue. 
If the expert is made aware at the outset of the relevant case 
circumstances and, crucially, what the person of interest will 
assert in his defence, then she will be able to specify the 
relevant propositions for which DNA, and possibly other forms 
of examination, would provide help in addressing. 
The second factor is the adoption of standard definitions 
and terminology to encourage clear communication and 
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also, on the other hand, a list of possible explanations for the 
transfer (as a result of specific activities). How do they decide 
what the DNA evidence means, and how does the evidence 
impact their decision?
For a more efficient way to have dealt with this case, 
we need to go back to the start. If the guidance of the case 
assessment and interpretation model5 had been followed, the 
forensic science provider should firstly have contacted the 
police client to explore the relevant case circumstances and 
identify the key issue. In this case, it is of crucial significance 
that the complainant and defendant are cohabiting. The 
defendant admits to handling the necklace recently but 
denies pulling it tightly around his partner’s neck. With this 
knowledge, the issue becomes clear – did the defendant 
pull the necklace tightly around his partner’s neck? The 
competing propositions, based on the prosecution and defence 
assertions, can be set out in the case notes:
■■ Prosecution proposition – the defendant pulled the necklace 
tightly around his partner’s neck;
■■ Defence alternative – the defendant simply handled the 
necklace.
The expert now needs to consider what type of examination 
strategy will help address effectively the issue of whether the 
defendant pulled the necklace tightly around his partner’s neck. 
Simply swabbing the whole necklace and seeing if matching 
DNA profiles are obtained will not provide the fact-finder 
with any help in resolving the fact at issue. The probability of 
obtaining matching profiles from the swab if the defendant 
pulled the necklace tightly would seem to be of a similar value 
to the probability of obtaining matching profiles if he had simply 
handled the necklace recently. The LR would be approximately 1. 
Depending on what the complainant would say about how 
she wears the necklace and which areas the defendant allegedly 
grabbed and pulled tight, the expert may decide to swab different 
areas of the necklace. These swabs could then be analysed 
for the presence and quantity of matching DNA profiles in the 
different areas. The quality of interpretation of the outcomes of 
the analysis depends upon the expert’s knowledge and expertise 
in assigning robust probabilities for the transfer and persistence 
of DNA in such circumstances. Of course, this depends on the 
quality and quantity of relevant data to inform those probabilities. 
Assuming the expert has such data, knowledge and expertise, 
it could be the case that she assesses the findings as far more 
probable if the prosecution proposition rather than the defence 
proposition were true. The findings would therefore support the 
prosecution proposition over the defence proposition.
The problem that has been highlighted by this hypothetical 
case example should not be taken, however, as a suggestion that 
DNA has become a valueless type of evidence. The important 
point is that the assessment of probative value is intimately 
related to the case circumstances, to the allegations made 
by the parties, and to task-relevant case circumstances. This 
evaluative task requires case-specific thinking. DNA and other 
so-called transfer evidence does not have an intrinsic or default 
value that could be assigned without regard to the context of the 
case, nor does it reduce to a single predefined statistic. Before 
any statistics can be introduced, it is essential to clarify first the 
relevant issue and circumstances. Indeed, the probative value 
in our case example might turn out to be quite different if, for 
example, the defendant and the victim do not know each other. 
In such a case, the scientist will need to assess the probability 
of finding the DNA given that an unknown person assaulted 
the victim, and that there was no previous manipulation of the 
necklace by the defendant. The probability assigned under the 
condition of this proposition might turn out to be much lower 
than one assigned under a condition in which the defendant is a 
cohabitee of the complainant. In which case, the LR would have 
more probative force than in the ‘cohabitee’ situation and would 
provide stronger evidence against a defendant. 
Conclusion
The “source-to-activity” problem is not one that crops up solely 
in DNA cases; it can occur in any type of scientific evidence, 
especially with transferable materials such as fibres, traces of 
drugs, explosives and gunshot residues. Experts, investigators, 
lawyers, judges and jurors all need to understand the problem 
and apply mitigating procedures, as do experts themselves. 
However, one of the pending challenges is to foster this 
understanding in an operating legal system where time, 
monetary constraints and caseload pose obstacles to 
continuing education, review, reflection and interdisciplinary 
exchange. The Royal Statistical Society has supported and 
continues to support works to help overcome the gap between, 
on the one hand, academic research, knowledge and expertise 
(bit.ly/2TiWHsa) and, on the other hand, the need for resources 
readily accessible for practitioners (bit.ly/2H6unD8). ■
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